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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-----oooOooo----ROBERT E. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

15571

DIONNE BRADLEY,
Defendant and Respondent.
-----oooOooo----REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
-----oooOooo----STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injury sustained by pedestrian in an auto/pedestrian accident.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury which found plaintiff and
defendant equally negligent, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the
defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmation of the lower court judgment
and denial of Motion for New Trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of February 7, 1976, plaintiff was in the
process of crossing Sunnyside Avenue at its intersection with Guardsman Way en route to the University of Utah and defendant was driving
a 1971 Ford Matador automobile west on Sunnyside Avenue on her way
to the Salt Lake City Public Library when they were involved in an
auto/pedestrian accident.
Plaintiff was injured as a result of that collision; however, the question, nature or extent of his damages is not before this
Court on appeal.
At trial, the case was submitted to the jury on a
general verdict with special Interrogatories after all of the evidence
was in.

After some deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for defen-

dant and judgment of no cause of action based upon its determination
that plaintiff and defendant were equally negligent and responsible for
the collision._ This appeal re suits from that verdict and the lower court's
denial of plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.
ARGUMENT
THE JURY'S DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT WERE EQUALLY NEGLIGENT IS
CONSISTENT BOTH WITH THE LAW AND WITH
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL; AND THE
LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

A review of the evidence will show that reasonable men
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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could have come to the same conclusion as did the jury, to

wit~

that

plai!J.tiff and defendant were equally negligent and responsible for the
accident.

Certainly, it is the law in Utah that the verdict of a jury

must not be set aside unless a reasonable man could not come to the
same conclusion even when all of the evidence and inferences fairly
derived therefrom are taken in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.

See Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P. 2d 66 (1960).

The verdict is protected by a bulwerk of rules best articulated in the
auto/pedestrian case of Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d
680 (1954) as follows:
. . . First, by the general proposition
that the judgment and proceedings in the
lower court are presumptively correct with
the burden upon defendant to show error.
Second, where a trial judge has passed upon
a question and a jury, presumably fair and
impa:t:tial, has made a finding, while such is
not controlling, it is at least entitled to some
consideration and should not be wholly ignored in reviewing the situation and attempting
to see, as objectively as possible, whether
reasonable minds might so conclude. Third,
that the court must review the evidence, togetherwith every inference fairly arising
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and similarly, must consider any
lack or failure of evidence in the same light,
which we do in reviewing the facts here.
The most helpful expos~ on the factors and elements to be
considzred in a case of this type on appeal is found in the case of
Pollesche v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P. Zd 236
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the fact to be such as will support the ruling
which we are called upon to review; but if,
after giving due consideration to the fact
that the trial judge is better able to weigh
conflicting evidence, the evidence be such
nevertheless as to imuel but one reasonable
conclusion, and that as to the fact adverse
to the ruling, it would be our duty as an
appellate court to so declare, notwithstanding there might be some conflict in the
evidence.
In Moser v. Zions Co-op Mere. Inst.,
[114 Utah 58, 65, 197 P. 2d 136 (1948)],
this court stated that if reasonable minds
could have found as the jury did from the
evidence before it, then this court cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the party's motion for new trial on
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict. [Emphasis added.]
In short, this Court held that it was the province of the
jury to weigh the conflicting evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses and to determine the questions of fact including the ultimate
facts of negligence and causation.

In that case, upon examination of

the evidence as disclosed by the record it was apparent that there was
a substantial conflict of evidence as to the material issues of fact and
t.l,.e Court, accordingly, held that there was no abuse of discretion by
the lower court in denying plaintiff's Motions.
The evidence in this case regarding negligence and
causation was not so clear as to impel but one reasonable conclusion,
and that as to a fact adverse to the lower court ruling.

The following

exerpts and summaries of the testimony of plaintiff, defendant,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Rayn10nd W. Ward and ArtieR.

Ban.~s,

Jr., the four witnesses who

testified about the circumstances of the auto/pedestrian accident,
demonstrate a substantial conflict of evidence not only as to the
material facts in general, but as to the ultimate facts of negligence
and causation as well.
As a review of the record will show, there was substantial credible evidence justifying the jury's conclusion that plaintiff
and defendant were equally negligent.

With respect to the plaintiff's

negligence, if the facts are that he sprinted out in front of defendant's
automobile, out of a place of safety and into a place of danger, it was
reasonable and prudent for the jury to conclude that he was negligent.
Or, if plaintiff walked across the crosswalk on Sunnyside Avenue and
said to himself, I'm in the crosswalk and everybody else in the world
that may come along this street must watch out for me and for my
safety and must not get me in a position of danger, then the jury was
reasonable a..-:td prudent in concluding that plaintiff was negligent.

Or,

if plaintiff walked across that street and never looked east and never
paid attention to traffic, then the jury was reasonable and prudent in
finding hir.::t negligent.

Any of the above findings of fact, or any com-

bination thereof, v;ould be sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
Looking specifically to the record, it shows that Officer
ArtieR. Banks, Jr. of the Salt Lake City Police Department L'1vestigated
the

acc~dent.

IR. T. 14)

Although Officer Banks did not recall whether
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he spoke with the plaintiff about the circumstances of the accident
on the night of the accident or the follo\ving day (R. T. 20}, he did
recall that when he spoke with and questioned the plaintiff, he
appeared to hear and understand the questions and his answers were
responsive.

(R. T. 21}

Appellant's Brief would have us believe that

when plaintiff spoke with Officer Banks he was under the influence of
medication, in considerable pain, and in-and-out of consciousness,
and that anything he might have said at that time is not to be believed.
Thus, the obvious inference that plaintiff did not know what he was
saying.

However, plaintiff's answers to all of Officer Bank's questions

were responsive, the obvious inference being that he understood the
questions and gave the appropriate answers.

When asked by Officer

Banks "what happened" plaintiff responded that when he was halfway
across the eros swalk he saw defendant's car approaching and "sprinted
to try to get across the road."

(R. T. 22} That statement was credible.

That is consistent with the testimony of Raymond W. Ward
who was driving four to five car lengths behind the defendant (R. T. 3}
at the time of the accident and who was able to see the plaintiff through
the rear and front windows of defendant's automobile.

(F. T. 3} He

stated that plaintiff was traveling across the crosswalk at a "medium
to a fast gate.

He was walking along.

He wasn't going slow.

11

(R. T. 10}

Dionne Bradley testified that she was traveling at a speed of approximately thirty (30} miles per hour !R. T. 31, 33, l7l}; that she was about
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fi:ty (50) feet away from the plaintiff when she first saw him (R. T. 31);
and that although she immediately swerved to the left she was unable
to avoid the ensuing collision.

(R. T. 32)

Further, the evidence showed

that when she first saw the plaintiff he was right in front of her (R. T.
31, 32) and that the right front of her car was the probable point of im-

pact.

(R. T. 33, 171) Defendant would have been traveling about forty-

four (44) feet per second.

If we are to believe defendant's testimony

that plaintiff was in the middle of the defendant's lane, fifty (50) feet
away when she first saw him, even if he had been sprinting he would have
been unable to take more than a step or so, if that, before impact.
Appellant's Brief alleges at one point that there was no
serious disagreement as to the cause or causes of the accident.
not true.

That's

For example, contrary in some respects to what he told

Officer Banks, plaintiff testified at the time of trial that he stopped at
the corner of Greenwood Terrace and Sunnyside Avenue, waited for two
eastbound automobiles to pass by, and then proceeded north across
Sunnyside Avenue without looking to the east or west for vehicular
traffic.

(R. T. 40, 70, 122) After entering the crosswalk, plaintiff

continued, he noticed a car westbotmd, but it seemed to be far enough
away and 1noving slow enough that he could safely cross the street.
40, 70)

(R. T.

Further, plaintiff stated thet from the time he first observed

the aut01nobile and co:1tinucd to v:alk across the street, he did not again
look to ti:e east tc•\R.n1

westbr~'-tnd

traffi•2 LL'1til ju3t before impact.

(H. T.
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12S, 126)

l\or, was he aware of the sound of a car or its headlights

until that time.

(R. T. 125, 1 26)

Plaintiff admitted that, at the time

of trial, his recollection of what transpired after the collision was
confused and that his recollection of events that occurred prior to
impact were not "crystaline. "

(R. T. 126)

Mr. Ward's testimony also conflicted with that of other
\vi.tnesses on several other questions of fact.

For instance, he testi-

fied that the day of the accident was a clear day and that at the time of
the accident it was still quite light.

(R. T. 2) At one point he stated

that he did not believe the defendant had her headlights on at the time
of the accident (R. T. 4), and later added that he was certain he did
not have his headlights on and equally certain that the defendant did
not have her lights on.

(R. T. 8-9)

Further, he stated that none of

the other automobiles on the road at the time had their headlights on,
IR, T. 9)
~While

on cross-examination, Officer Banks stated that at

the time he was dispatched to the accident, he was at or near the
Salt Lake City limits on State StJCeet.

(R. T, 18) He testified that

although it was still fairly light at the time he had his headlights on.

\R. T. 18)

Further, he testified that aiter arriving at the scene of the

accident he investigated defendant's automobile and found her headlights to still be on.

(R. T. 19)

Dicmne Bradley, de:endant, testified that at the time of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the accident it was dark and that her headlights were on low beam.

(R. T. 32, 170)
Again, Mr. Ward testified that although he observed
the defendant for two (2) to three (3) seconds prior to the collision, he
did not observe plaintiff look to the east, toward defendant's automobile.
(R. T. 10) In fact, he added later in his testimony that plaintiff did not
seem to be aware of any vehicular traffic.

(R. T. 11)

The jury was properly instructed on the law.

The follow-

ing Instructions, along with others not particularly germane to this
appeal, were given to the jury:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
As used in these instructions, "negligence"
means the failure of a party to do what a
reasonably prudent person would have done,
or doing what a resonably prudent person
would not have done, under the circumstances
of this situation, to protect oneself and others
from the risk of harm. Negligence may consist of acting or of omitting to act. Negligence
of plaintiff toward himself does not bar the
plaintif£ from recovery of damages unless his
negligence is as great or greater than the
negligence of the defendant against whom recovery is sought. If plaintiff's negligence is
not as great as defendant's negligence, damages
allowed will be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the
plaintiff.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
In 3.dditicm to this general definitioo:1 of negligence, there are other rules of law, as well
as statutes enacted by the legislatur-e for sa:e
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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operation of vehicles on the highways. A
person who fails to comply with such rules or
statutes is negligent, as that term is used in
the verdict and in the court's instructions.

INSTRUCTION NO. 10
You are instructed that it was the duty of
each of the parties, defendant and plaintiff,
to meet the standard of a reasonably prudent
person under the circumstances of this case,
to avoid risk of harm to himself and to the
other party, and to observe and be aware of
the condition of the highway, traffic thereon,
and other existing conditions.

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
A driver of a motor vehicle has a duty n0t
to drive the vehicle on a highway at a speer:'.
greater than is reasonable and prudent under
the conditions, and having regard to the actual
and potential hazards then existing, and speed
is to be so controlled as may be necessary to
avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or
other conveyance on or entering the highway,
in compliance with legal requirements and the
duty of all persons to use due care. The statutes
also require that the driver of a vehicle shall,
con sis tent with the foregoing, drive at an
appropriate reduced speed when approaching
and crossi.Ylg an intersection, or when special
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or
other traffic, or by reason of weather or highway
conditions.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
A driver of a motor vehicle is required to
yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping
if necessary to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing th~ roadway within a cross>valk when the
pedestrian is up,rn th2 half of the roadway up,on
which the vehicle is trayeling, or when the pedestrio.n is apJ::ll·,,aching so closely from the opposite
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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half of the roadway· as to be in danger.
The perscm having the right-of-v,;ay may
assume tha;: the other -...vill yield. Failure of
defendant to so yield the rigd-of-way to
plaintiff v;ould constitute negligence on defendant's part, if you so find,

1:.\SJ:RUCT10.:-J NO.

13

It is the duty of every operator of a motor
vehicle to exercise ordinary care and keep a
careful lookout ahead and about him. The
exercise of ordinary care requires him to
make observations at a point or points where
his observa:ions will be efficient for protection
frorn injury- to persons or property, requires
the seasonable and effective use of a driver's
sense of sight to observe timely, not only the
presence, location and movement of other users
of the highway, pedestrians as well as "'>ehicles,
but traffic signs and signals, obstructions to
vis:io:1, and e'.rer)rthir'_g el3e \.vhich might \.Varn
him of possible danger.

1-"iSTRGCTIO:'-J :0i0.

14

You are instructed that every motor vehicle
operator or pedestrian has the right to assume
and act upon the assumption that every other
motor -...-ehicle operator or pedestrian "\\rill observe the rules of the road and -...vill not otherVIise negligentl;· e:lqJOse himself to or put others
in danger; :c11d he nray continue in that assumption u.r1til it becon1es apparent, or in the
exercise of ordinary- care ought to be apparent,
to hirC~ that son1~ other rnotor vehicle operator
or pedestrian is, by \vrongful conduct, creating
dange:.~,

uris not a\vare of, or ca1mc)t avoid tl1at
L"l such a sihution, every 1notor v2hi:~le
operat,Jr or pedestrian mu~t, in order tcJ be> free
fron1 negligence, m::.ke all reasonable effo :-ts t1)
a~,-oid cullisii):-!. )r injo.1ry, even though th'2 other
111o;_or --.-ehicle operator or pedestria!"l is in the
v.:_cong i:1 !~~s C'>Ul'.:>e oi conduct.
dange:c.
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\',-ith respect to plaintiff's duties and responsibilities as a pedestrian,
the cuurt instructed the jury as follows:

INSTRUCTIO'l NO.

15

In arriving at a verdict in this case, it is
also necessary for you to determine whether
the plaintiff, Robert E. Anderson, at and
immediately prior to the time of the accident,
was negligent with respect to caring for his
own safety.

The terms ''negligence'' I have previously
defined for you, and this definition you will
bear in mind, together with the following
instructions, in determining your answer to
this question.
Every person in all situations has a d~r,- to
exercise o:-dinac)' care for his own safety.
This does not mean that he is required at all
hazards to avoid inj1_:ry-. His duty, rather, is
that of taking such precaution to avoid iiJ.jury
as would be taken by an ordi_narily prudent
man in situations the same as or similar to
that of the plaintiff at and immediately prior
to the time of the accident.
To be free of negligence, one must use
ordi..cary care LYJ. the exercise of his intelligence
and of his facilities o£ sight and hearing, to the
end that he may become aware of the existence
of danger to hin1. The failure to use such
intelligence and faculties, thereby failing to discov·er danger, is negligence, as I have before
defined that term for you.
His likewise the duty of everyone to recognize
and appreciat-e all dangers which are open and
obvious to him, or v:hich would have been appreciated at th,o ticc'1e by a reasonably prudent perS(JJ"'_

\.v}-u)

is

i.~

the exe:tcise of ordinary care.
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INSTRUCTIO~ ~0.

16

Before attempting to cross a street that
is being used for the traffic of motor
vehicles, it is a pedestrian's duty to make
reasonable observations to learn the traffic
conditions confronting him; to look to that
vicinity from which, were a vehicle approaching, it \vould immediately endanger his
passage; and to make the determination which
a reasonably prudent person would make under
the san1e circumstances as to whether it is
reasonably safe to attempt the crossing. What
observations he should make, and what he
should do for his own safety, while crossing
the street are matters which the law does not
attempt to regulate in detail and for all occasions, except in this respect: It places upon
him the continuing duty to exercise the care a
reasonably prudeCJ.t person would observe to
avoid an accident.

1:\'STRUCTION

~0.

17

In determining whether the plaintiff was
negligent with regard to his own safety, you
may take into accm.1..r1t the fact that a pedestrian
crossir_g a busy street must be constantly vigilant
for his safety with respect to all of the conditions
around him, and tnat even if a car is seen approaching. u.:cless it is so positioned as to constitute an
imncediate hazard to him, he is not necessarily·
obliged to focus full and undivided attention on
that particular car and so calculate nis entire
conduct as to avoid being struck by it. He need
not anti=ipate tnat the driver will speed, fail to
obsen:e, fail tn control her car, fail to afford
him the right-of-v:ay, or otherwise be negligent
unless, in the exercise of ordinary care, h~
observ.:;s or sh1uld ha.ve observeJ so:rnething to
\Va rn him of sue h improper con duet..
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be::·He it. to wit:

that the parties were equally negligent and respon-

si'::J'e for the accident.

Nonetheless, even though the lov:er court

satisfied the demands of Utah law plaintiff would have the decision
overturned on the basis of Wisconsin law.
Plaintiff would have this Court adopt Wisconsin's scope of
revie·w on motions for new trials in comparative negligence type cases.
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth the
grounds upon which a motion for a new trial may be granted in this
state:
Rule 59.
ment

0Jev,; Trials; Amendments rA Lv:lc:;-

(a) Grounds. Subject to the prov1s10ns or
Rule 61, a ne\\· trial -nay be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for 2.ny of the follcnvi·'lg cases; pro-.rided,
however, that on a motion for a ne>v trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open
the judg=eP.t if one has been entered, take addiLional testin10ny, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgn'lent:
( l) Irregularity in the proceedi.'lgs of the
court, jury CJr adverse party, or 3.ny order of
the court, or abuse discretion by which either
pa<:ty was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) .0.\isccmduct of the jury; and whenever any
one or n'lore of the jurors have been i!lduced to
assent to anv oeneral or special verdict, or to
a finding on ·a,~~- question submitted to them by
th2 u.urt, by resort tu a determination by·
c-hJ..DCl~ IJr as a rcsul1: of bribery, such rnisconduct nl_2 y b:--- pr,>·.~ed by• the a££ida ..,ri.t of an;/ one
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of the jurors.

(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material
for the party making the application, which
he could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given uncle r the influence of passion or prejudice.

(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
(7)

Error in law.

[Emphasis added.]
According to Section 270. 49(1) \'{. S. A., a new trial
ma;· be ordered on any of four grounds in Wisconsin:

(l)

Errors

in the t::-ia1; !2) verdict contrary to law or evidence; (3) excessive or
inadeq\late damages; and/or (4) in the interest of justice.

See, Tuschel

,., Hil.asch. ! 7-± :0:. W. 2d 479 (\\'is. 1970)
Appellant's Briei cites several Wisconsin Supreme
Cou:r-t cases, in vthich ne\V trials \Vere granted in

cases. b

comparati-v~e

negligence

support of the geP.era1 proposition that a new trial should be

grantee ii the pcrr:r:!ntage distribution oE negligence is clearly a_.;ain;:;t
the g!'c>at \\·ei_ght and preponderance of the evidence and is contrary to
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coUioiCJ:o,

The jury apportio,-,ed sixty percent (60%) of the cause of

r.egligence to the plaintifi and forty percent (40'fo) to the defendant.
The trial court granted a motion for a new trial, but failed to follow
the proper procedure.

On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court

exercised its discretionary power to grant a new trial.

That decision,

hov;ever, was based upon the Wisconsin "interest of justice" clause
not found in Utah law and was further granted for the reasons that
11) there was no evidence to justify the apportionment of the causal
:negligence and (2) the jury granted no damages although the testimony
c: personal injuries was unccnotroverted.

In the case sL':J ;-,,dic_c: there

was some substantial evidence to justify the apportionment of the
c2xsa1 r.eglige:nce and the jury never did reach the question of damages.
In the case of Korleski v. LJ.ne, lG \'.'is. 2d 163, 102

'<. -,_.

Zd 23--! 11960) the Wisconsin Supreme Court is careful to note

that thei' were not prepared to say

?.S

a matter of law that the causal

1:egligence CJf plaintiff did not equal the causal negligence of defendant;
hcw:ever, the court did exercise its discretion under the "interest of

Ao stated in the case of :?ollesche v. Transamerican Ins.
Co., sunra, in utah it. up0n examination of the evidence as disclosed
b:; tLe ::-eLr,_:--cl, it is 2.p~2.~·pnt th2t there i.s a substantial conflict of

~\""ide::ce as ~.-u the rn3..tc:rial issues of fact in the case relative to v;rhich
~

: l ·;:
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have foc:nd as the jury did, then the Utah Suprern.c Court will not
int~riere

with the lower court's affirn1ation of the jury's verdict.

As stated in the case of S2ath ''· Ser.::da, 41 Wis.Zd 448, 164 N. W. 2d
246 (1969) a new trial may be granted in the interest of justice in
Wisconsin when jury findi.r1gs are contrary to the great weight of the
evidence even though they are supported by credible evidence.

In

11liconsin, this is the rule whether applies to the question of damages,
negligence, causation or comparison of negligence.

See, Brunke v.

Popp, 2l \\'is. 2d -158, 124 N. W. 2d 642 (1963); and Pingel v. Thielman,
20 \'lis. 2d 246, 121 N. II.'. Zd 749 (1963).

The standards for review in

the two states are dis ti.YJ.c t.
;\loreover, in the \Viscons:n cases of Loomans v.
;\lib·:aukee I\·luma1 Ins. Co., SUDra. SDath v. Sereda, supra, DeGroff
v. Sch...rnude, 38 l\'. \',', 2d 730 (1.'.'is. 1974), and I\·larkey v. Hauck, 73
Wis. 2d 163, 242 N. W. 2d 914 11976) the Wisconsin Supreme Court
simply afiirrned the lower court's grant of a new trial.

As stated in

each :Jf the above-mentioned cases, the reviewing court \vould nol
reverst.: a

deci.~ion

granting a ne\-v trial in the interest of justice

absent a showing of clear abus2 of discretion or an erroneous application of the b.\'1.
ruling.

In short, the supei·i,)r court affirmed the lower court's

Th:.. argun1ent.. thu.t this Court adopt a de jure o:· de facto
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\!any of the philosophical arguments and pleas made in
Ap;)ellant' s Brief are persuasive.

It seems to tmderline and empha-

size the apparent weakness and injustice of a non pure-comparal:i.vt!
negligence statute.

Maybe Utah ought to adopt a pure comparative

""egligence policy; nevertheless, as noted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the case of Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co,, 47 Wis. 2d 120,
177 N. W. 2d 513 (1970) the state Supreme Court has authority to change
the common law while the legislature is the best body equipped to adopt
change from existing comparative negligence doctrine to a pure compara tive negligence doctrine.
It is also alleged that defer.se counsel's

pl·ejndiced the jury.

"shac!d~d·

remarks

It is alleged that defense counsel stated that

deic:!ldant should not be "shackled" with a judgment.

The record will

show that defense counsel in his closiEg arguments stated only that the
ddendant should not be shackled with all of the responsibility for the
accident as far as the negligence is concerned.

IR. T. 212)

CO:'\CLUSION
Under uur judicial system, the people are the repository
rof the P' .wer faml. ·which the !c.\·; is derived.
c?:pl·t-;::;si~,:---. o[ tl--.c: y;,rill of the pcuple~

ln short, the law is the

The functioning of a cross section

oi t!ce citL-:·cn ry as a. jury is the mdhod by· which the people express

thi

.,.,--ill :n

(_1._-l~· d·~:- 1

1

t: 1 e

;:.:.pplil·c_di'>~1 cJ L~·-:, tr~ c'.Jntro-.•ersics \.vhich arise Wld~r it.

::2-t-:_c. '>Y-i ,:~t.

rll_ll'

C'I.~~Lillllirc12l and CJUr statut:..>ry pro\-i5iOn3
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2.;:

su:·e trial by jur:,· to citizens of this state.
Courts, as final arbiters of law, could assume arbi-

trary, capricious and dangerous powers by presuming to determine
questions of fact \Vhich litigants have a right to have passed upon by
juries.

One of the advantages of the jury system is to safeguard against

such arbitrary and capricious power in the courts.

To the credit oc the

courts of this country, they have been extremely reluctant to infrin_se
t:?On this right, and by leav-ing it unimpaired have kept the adminis tration o£ justice close to the people.

Certainly, the rights of litigants

should not be surrendered to the arbitrary· and capricious will of
juries without regard to whether there is a violation of legal rights
2.s

a basis for recovery.

Courts do have supervisory duties and

resp:msibilities and control O'>er the action of juries which also is
essential to the proper administration of justice.

Nevertheless, it

is important the courts remain cognizant of the vital importance of
the privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice.

Clearly, un-

less the question of comparati?e negligence is free from doubt, the
court cannot pass upon it as a question of lav,;.

If the court is in

doubt y;hether reasonable men might arrive at different conclusioi'.s
the:o that ver)' doubt determirtes th2 question to be one of fact for the

jury a.nd not one of law for the court.
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Lased upor. the: foregoing, respondent respectfully requE:sts
tb.a~

this Court affirm the lower court's decision.

I

I

Res-J:lect£ully submitted,
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